In conclusion we suggest that a review of the climate-relevant trade and investment rules is necessary at the international level, involving climate, agriculture and trade regulators, supported by scientific, economic and legal expertise. The purpose of this review is to avoid litigation jeopardising the implementation of the Paris Agreement. At the same time, such a review must be wide-ranging, because the objective is to ensure maximum policy space for climate mitigation and adaptation without negatively impacting on other countries, or unduly restricting trade and investment, especially in poor developing countries. Last but not least, this intergovernmental and inter-institutional review is urgent, because the results should provide as quickly as possible the legal security necessary for regulators, NDC developments and reviews, and international standard-setting processes. 
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Introduction
On 12 December 2015 the world at large feted the successful conclusion of the Paris Agreement.
2 Yet, scarce attention was paid to the legal implications of the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) which each party is individually committed to submit, and progressively update, under Article 3 of this agreement. 3 This lack of attention can be explained by the virtual absence of indications on how individual countries are to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG). 4 Negotiations had focused on the formulation of the 'top-down' commitment of all parties to address climate change, on the overall reduction targets, and on the technology and finance transfers required by developing countries. The 'bottom-up' obligations are basically to design NDC which will progressively mitigate global warming, and to account for delivery and performance.
The discretion enjoyed by all NDC under the Paris Agreement is greater than that of its predecessor agreements. As will be shown, this implementation freedom also applies to the way each party has to take into account the development dimension in the formulation of its
NDC. The principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities
(CBDRRC) has been laid down in Article 2.2. 5 In addition to the development concerns, numerous other objectives must also be considered such as the sustainability of development, human rights, health, migration and gender equality -again, without clearly formulated indications of the implementation modalities.
6
Within these basic and complex commitments, at this stage the Paris Agreement offers nearly total latitude for implementation. For the time being, it completely lacks common standards, enforcement mechanisms, or sanctions for non-compliance. This was different for 2 Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). UNTS 8 July 2016, Chapter XXVII-7-d, Registration Number 54113. Downloadead on 5 September 2017 at https://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php. 3 Article 3: As nationally determined contributions to the global response to climate change, all Parties are to undertake and communicate ambitious efforts […] with the view to achieving the purpose of this Agreement as set out in Article 2. The efforts of all Parties will represent a progression over time, while recognizing the need to support developing country Parties for the effective implementation of this Agreement. 4 Article 4.13: Parties shall account for their nationally determined contributions. In accounting for anthropogenic emissions and removals corresponding to their nationally determined contributions, Parties shall promote environmental integrity, transparency, accuracy, completeness, comparability and consistency, and ensure the avoidance of double counting, in accordance with guidance adopted by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement.
Article 4.14: In the context of their nationally determined contributions, when recognizing and implementing mitigation actions with respect to anthropogenic emissions and removals, Parties should take into account, as appropriate, existing methods and guidance under the Convention, in the light of the provisions of paragraph 13 of this Article.
5 ‚This Agreement will be implemented to reflect equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.' (emphasis added) 6 For example, Preamble Indent 11 lists no less than a dozen concerns and objectives having to guide climate change action:
‚Acknowledging that climate change is a common concern of humankind, Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well as gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity. ' the UNFCCC predecessor agreement, the Kyoto Protocol (2007), which described in some detail both domestic and international Joint Implementation measures like the Emission Trading Schemes (ETS) 7 and their joint mechanism International Emissions Trading (IET), 8 the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), 9 the Green Investment Scheme (GIS), 10 or the Border Adjustment Measures (BAM). 11 The Paris Agreement contains no implementation tools, and foresees no specific mechanisms for joint implementation such as ETS and CDM; it leaves the choice -and the responsibility to respect international trade and investment rules -to the parties. 12 The problem with this freedom to regulate under 'Paris' consists, as will be shown below, in the justification under international treaty law of WTO rules violations such as in GATT-Article XX (General Exceptions) and on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).
13
The Parties to the Paris Agreement do intend to work on standard-setting, including for agriculture. The October 2017 Decision at COP23 to 'address issues related to agriculture' can be seen as a first step for the commitment enshrined in the Agreement to 'progressively' improve NDC in five-year steps, and not to scale back existing commitments (UNFCCC/IPCC 2017). The monitoring mechanism built into this ratchet clause definitely lends some force to the review and improvement process. This article tries to answer these questions at the interface between climate change mitigation and adaptation measures and trade rules. The hypothesis which will be developed here is that border measures and agricultural subsidies differentiating according to different product or process footprints may face WTO-compatibility problems, especially where they are not clearly based on mandatory international standards.
The interaction between Paris and WTO is analysed in the following order.
Section Two recalls the various national and international agricultural policy tools which can be used for climate change mitigation programmes. We list these measures in a ‚Climate Change Agricultural Tool Box'. Section Three analyses these tools by describing the basic rules under WTO Law potentially applying to such measures in general, and specifically for agriculture. We also compare the development dimension as it is addressed under the Paris Agreement and in the WTO, respectively, and add a few considerations on Regional Trade Agreements. With this background, Section Four examines the main patterns described in recent literature, and emerging from the available INDC and NDC, in the light of the most relevant WTO rules and case law. This examination shows the potential conflicts of these measures in the light of the relevant general non-discrimination rules and non-specific commitments of the WTO, including existing or possibly required flexibilities, exceptions, exemptions, interpretations, amendments and waivers.
The conclusions in Section Five summarise the main problems potentially arising under relevant trade rules for the implementation of the Paris Agreement in the field of agriculture. We then propose an intergovernmental and horizontal review of these issues. Finally, we outline a number of possible solutions, avoiding litigation and securing non-trade distorting avenues.
A ‚Climate Change Tool Box' for Agriculture
A very large number of different measures can be considered for the implementation of (more or less) climate-smart agricultural policies and practices, including new production and enhanced productivity technologies, science, education and extension, investment and trade measures. Whether and which of these measures effectively and efficiently reduce GHG emissions will be the essence of the NDC reviewing and reporting process established by the Paris Agreement. Häberli (2016 and 2017a) According to FAO research, at the time of writing this article very few NDC indicated the type of measures with a possible trade or (foreign) investment impact (Brenda and Zimmermann 2018) . The preliminary legal analysis of some such measures in Section 4 will look at potential conflicts with trade rules of (1) climate measures taken at the border, (2) footprint taxes, (3) mitigation and adaptation incentives, (4) labels, and (5) risk management measures. Before that, Section 3 looks at the possibly relevant trade rules and case law.
WTO Rules and Case Law Relevant for Climate Action
The relevant rules and commitments agreed by the WTO membership enshrine nondiscrimination as their basic principle. This section starts by explaining where this principle can help to reinforce climate action -and where it might hamper it (1). Some specific WTO rules for agriculture show similar issues (2). This leads to the question whether the available exceptions allow for climate action (3), and how the Paris Agreement and the WTO try to address legitimate development concerns, within the overarching respective commitments to reduce greenhouse gases and unjustified obstacles to trade (4). Finally, even though Regional Trade Agreements do not contain numerous substantive disciplines and policy constraints in respect of agriculture-related climate-smart policies, a look at their procedural components shows a potentially powerful incentive for trading partners to adopt such policies without trade distortions (5).
Basic WTO Non-Discrimination Trade Rules
According to the preamble of the WTO Agreement, the main objective of the World Trade Organization is ‚raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand' basically by ‚reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations.'
15
Like for the Paris Agreement, the attainment of these objectives has been qualified in 1995 by a number of sustainable development considerations: "allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both 15 UNTS, vols. 1867 , 1868 and 1869 , No. 1-31874, and annex A in vols. 1890 and 1895 to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development."
According to the WTO Appellate Body this preamble text ‚gives colour, texture and shading to the rights and obligations of Members under the WTO Agreement.'
16 It seems to offer a large discretion to the WTO membership in determining their own environmental objectives, policies and regulations (including their trade impact). Nonetheless -and here is the red line! -‚that autonomy is circumscribed only by the need to respect the requirements of the General Agreement and the other covered agreements.'
17
The most important WTO requirement can be described very simply as a prohibition of discrimination. The purpose is to avoid protectionism in the application of internal measures to imports. This means non-discrimination (a) between products and services of different foreign origins (MFN -Art. I GATT) and (b) between products and services of foreign and domestic origin (NT -Art. III GATT). WTO Law aims at preventing trade distortions and promoting competitive conditions between imported and domestic products. It does not ask for the objectives of, say, a climate-smart measure. But, since 2015, it prohibits all export subsidies i.e. even measures which might make sense under a mitigation perspective, such as export subsidies for low-footprint foodstuffs. Incidentally, WTO rules do not prevent selfdiscrimination, such as taxing GHG emissions arising from domestic food production only.
The main problem for climate-smart policies is the prohibition of discrimination between otherwise 'like' products differing in respect of their carbon footprint resulting from different production and processing methods (PPM). For instance, a BAM on imported commodities produced with a high GHG output cannot exceed taxes applied to ‚the like domestic product or in respect of an article from which the imported product has been manufactured or produced in whole or in part' (Art. II:2(a) GATT). 18 The essential question which will have to be answered on a case-by-case basis is whether the imported product is really a 'like' product, and whether it is accorded 'less favourable' treatment than that accorded to like domestic products. properties of the products; (ii) the extent to which the products are capable of serving the same or similar end-uses; (iii) the extent to which consumers perceive and treat the products as alternative means of performing particular functions in order to satisfy a particular want or demand; and (iv) the international classification of the products for tariff purposes.' In the same case the Appellate Body also made it clear that a panel needed ‚to examine, in each case, all of the pertinent evidence.'
20
Clara Brandi has noted a particular difficulty for the legal assessment of the so-called 'nonproduct related PPMs' (npr-PPM) which leave no trace in the final product. She rightly points out that the multilateral trading system does not make a clear distinction between products solely based on their levels of embedded carbon. 21 Whether such products can be considered ‚unlike' has never been settled in a WTO legal dispute.
Actually, it could even be argued that certain incentives offered to climate-friendly product imports are a form of discrimination against ‚like' products with a lesser mitigation impact. In a case with automobile subsidies and local content requirements (TRIMS), the Panel held that ‚a condition which must be met in order to obtain an advantage consisting of the right to import certain products duty-free' can be subject to the NT obligation in GATT-Article III:4, even if compliance is not mandatory.
22
As to the other condition for a violation of the non-discrimination obligation, the ‚less favourable treatment', the way a climate standard is applied to imports and to local producers may come under WTO scrutiny. In a case dealing with gasoline quality requirements the Panel ascertained that ‚the measure in question afforded to imported products less favourable treatment than that afforded to domestic products because sellers of domestic gasoline were authorized to use an individual baseline, while sellers of (chemically identical) imported gasoline had to use the more onerous statutory baseline.'
23
What matters here is, again, effective equality of competitive opportunities.
Specific Rules for Agricultural Trade possibly applying to Climate Measures
The main provisions for trade in agricultural products are found in the WTO Agreements on Agriculture (AoA) and on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM). Basically, rules and limits apply to four categories of protection and support policies.
1)
Border protection is strictly limited to tariffs. 24 The maximum rates ('bound'/'scheduled') cannot be increased without compensation (GATT-Article XXVIII). Import quotas are prohibited under Article XI GATT. Rapidly increasing import volumes or price decreases may legitimise a 'safeguard' action by countries having had to transform their NTB into tariffs. protection is available against imports threatening or jeopardising local production (GATT-Article XIX). But 'climate safeguards' at the border do not exist. 2) Domestic support is either trade-distorting or not and, consequentially, limited or not.
Except as outlined for category 4 below, there is no outright prohibition of agricultural product subsidies, but because they are considered to distort trade, they are limited for each and every WTO Member. The trigger and the conditions for unlimited governmental programmes are narrowly defined in the so-called Green Box (Annex 2 AoA). Eligible programmes which are possibly climate change-relevant include natural disaster relief, domestic food aid, food security stockpiles and income insurance, and other income safety nets discussed in Section 4.5 below. Yet, many developing countries now find themselves both without the financial means, and with little leeway under their Amber Box limits, to finance climate adaptation with programme support. True, there is a 'Developing Country Green Box' (AoA-Article 6.2) which allows, say, certain credit schemes and subsidies e.g. for irrigation construction, and even running costs of low-income and resource-poor producers.
25
However, the small print in this rather contorted text seems to offer little scope for specific climate measures -even though it did not prevent rapidly increasing notifications by many developing countries, including clearly product-specific programmes in large surplus producers like India, or in oil producing countries like Oman. In the absence of case law, it is unclear whether the alleged general development and poverty concerns would pass the test of WTO-compatibility for such measures. Given that, according to Smith et al (IPPC 2014) , more than 90% of GHG emissions from agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU) come from developing countries, a very careful review of the exact use of Article 6.2 by some of the largest developing countries seems to be important. So far, climate adaptation
has not yet been mentioned as a motive for Article 6.2 policies. 3) Export subsidies, a long-term concern of many competitive agricultural product exporters, were finally prohibited in December 2015, at the 10 th Ministerial
Conference in Nairobi. But the rules tightening mandated under the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) never reached consensus. Nonetheless, other potentially climate-relevant export competition instruments, namely export credits, international food aid, and state-owned export companies can be examined under the recourse to anti-circumvention provisions of AoA-Article 10 and, for state trading, GATT-Article XVII. Relevant case law (briefly described in Section 4) indicates limits for certain climate adaptation tools even of a temporary nature. 4) In line with AoA-Article 13, the WTO Subsidies Agreement (SCM) now also applies to agricultural export (and import displacement) measures. For climate mitigation purposes the strict disciplines under the SCM may become a problem. It is agreed that the origin of, say, methane is irrelevant for its impact on global warming. Hence, at least a time-limited subsidy to reduce agricultural GHG emissions in the EU or in the USA might actually have a beneficial impact; it could even be more effective than financing mitigation efforts by, say, all Sub-Saharan farmers. Nonetheless, the said incentive might fall foul of the SCM prohibition applying to subsidies that are specifically provided to an enterprise or industry or a group of enterprises or industries. On the other side, if farm subsidies claiming climate adaptation without actually doing so are to be avoided, any loosening of WTO disciplines might serve as a pretext for farmers to displace foreign competitors.
Incidentally, developed countries may also find problems in regulating imports in the wake of a disaster. The European Union used to issue so-called ‚hurricane licences' allowing EU producers, after a tropical storm, to import bananas from other countries. The original Panel had found that (exclusively) "producer organizations or operators can expect, in the event of a hurricane, to be compensated for their losses in the form of 'quota rents' generated by hurricane licences." The AB agreed, and noted that this practice affected the competitive conditions in the market in favour of bananas with EU origin, adding as its constant red line "[w]e do not dispute the right of WTO Members to mitigate or remedy the consequences of natural disasters. However, Members should do so in a manner consistent with their obligations under the GATT 1994 and the other covered agreements."
26
Clearly, climate change hits the screens of agricultural policymakers at a time of unfinished WTO business. The playing field, put simply, is not even. This can have serious consequences for food exporting and importing countries without substantial border protection, major subsidy allowances, or the remaining export promotion instruments. The main reason for this systemic weakness in WTO rules is the failure of the Doha Round negotiations, stalled since 2008, to pursue the 'reform process' under Article 20 AoA, and to agree on additional disciplines making trade patterns more sustainable, and more resilient under a climate change perspective.
3 Exceptions, Interpretations, Amendments and Waivers
As explained in Section 1 above, all national measures can be challenged by any concerned WTO Member and at any time. This right to complain, of course, is without prejudice to the ruling reached in a dispute. However, measures found not to be in conformity with the agreed WTO rules and market access commitments face the possibility of being reversed or otherwise sanctioned.
There is no rule without exceptions. Environmental protection qualifies in principle, if not in practice, as a legitimate exception for an otherwise WTO-incompatible measure under Article XX GATT. There are other exceptions as well. In this section we only look at the most relevant exceptions for environmental protection in general, inasmuch they might be found relevant for climate measures. As in the whole article we refrain from reaching conclusions as to the applicability of such exceptions, and on the WTO-compatibility of any specific measure.
The general exceptions in GATT-Article XX allow Members to take all necessary measures, for instance ‚to protect public morals' (lit. a); ‚to protect human, animal or plant life or health' (lit. b); ‚relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption' (lit.
26 AB Report, EC -Bananas III, para. 213 g). The somewhat antique language in lit. g dates back to 1947; but it has been clarified in a range of adjudicator decisions that, for instance, ‚natural resources' include endangered species such as sea turtles.
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Case law shows that many defences invoking Article XX exceptions were found not to justify a rules violation. The interesting question here would then be whether a Panel or the Appellate Body may theoretically find an incriminated climate-related measure to be legitimately based on binding public international law. The possibility of environmental treaty law prevailing under trade law is expressly foreseen under the Vienna Convention (VCLT), and has been recognised by the Appellate Body. Such a finding would then uphold the incriminated measure, and prevent retaliation by the complainant. However, so far no WTO ruling has ever recognised the mandatory nature of an environmental treaty in a specific case, or of a generally applicable international environmental standard.
The Appellate Body has repeatedly enjoined panels to allow both for a maximum policy space and to respect public international law such as environmental norms and human rights. In particular, panels are tasked with a ‚holistic' treaty interpretation pursuant to the customary rules as provided for in VCLT-Articles 31 and 32. 28 At the same time, panels as well as the AB itself do not and cannot make any new rules (Art. 3.1 DSU). They must look at the various exceptions foreseen in the WTO agreements, and invoked by the respondents. But they also have to respect the so-called ‚chapeau' of Article XX providing that all exceptions remain subject ‚to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade.'
(emphasis added) This again is the red line where so far virtually all measures claiming Article XX exceptions as a legal base have failed the test of non-discrimination. For instance, the EU tried to justify its seals product import ban with its (self-defined) ‚public morals' (Art. XX lit.a GATT), arguing that its import ban of seals products responded to public concerns about killing seals and their babies. In order to justify a marketing prohibition exception for seals hunted by Inuit of EU origin, it also invoked international standards outside WTO Law, adhered to by all the parties in that dispute, and laid down in various ILO Conventions, Appellate Body accepted the admissibility in principle of 'public morals' as a justification for trade discrimination. Nevertheless, they agreed with the complainants that the EU had not established that its seals regime had no less trade-restrictive alternative to a partial and discriminatory ban; they also found that the invoked international standards did not compel the EU to proscribe imports. Whether environmental treaty law will ever justify a trade rule violation in a WTO dispute remains an open question. As already pointed out, no WTO ruling has ever acknowledged the existence of a conflict between WTO and other international treaty rules, which would then have called for a decision on whether a general principle of law prevailed over WTO Law. The AB, never shy of admonishing panels to take international treaty law into account, forgot to even mention the VCLT in its final ruling in the seals case. Only one (unappealed) panel decision ruled that « the principle of precaution is a 'general principle of international law' » and could thus could be « considered a 'rule of international law' within the meaning of Article 31(3)(c) » (VCLT).
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There are further exceptions for all these rules. But it is far from being established that, say, mandatory cost internalisation of GHG emissions under a polluter-pays-principle would be found WTO-compatible if it was applied not only to domestic producers but also to imports. This being, so far no agricultural policy measure has had to pass such a test -simply because very few appear to have been taken; very few can be detected in the NDC, and none have been notified to WTO or reported in trade policy reviews.
Window 1: The Story of the EU's ETS Extension to Aviation
32 Panel Report EC -Biotech, para 7.67 (emphasis added). Isabelle Van Damme (2009, p. 369 ) noted that this Panel had recognised that treaties and general principles of law could constitute 'rules of international law' thereby rejecting a defence brought by the United States when it ruled that it did have the discretion to consider such rules as 'context' in order to determine the 'ordinary meaning' under Article 31.1 VCLT.
The WTO rulings for renewable energy measures are another sobering lesson for ‚mutual supportiveness' advocates. Only one fossil fuel case was ever settled in a formal dispute. 33 In that case the AB finding that the air contamination standards applied to domestic vs foreign gasoline did not meet the 'less trade restrictive' condition of the chapeau of Art XX; in that case, raising the domestic standard would have solved the WTO problem -and reduced air pollution. 34 But all of over a dozen disputes (cf. Box 2) on water, solar and wind energy ended with the respondents failing to convince WTO adjudicators that the incriminated measures did not afford additional protection to their domestic interests (NT) or discriminate between different foreign suppliers (MFN). 35 To the extent that a final ruling had been made public by the time of writing this article, all respondents had to withdraw or to adjust their incriminated measures. Without putting in doubt the legal justification of these rulings, this is 33 The ruling in another fossil fuel case was still pending at the time of writing: DS476 EC -Energy package which directly challenges EU subsidising programs on gas. According to the WTO website, the panel report is about to be published.
34 US -Gasoline (DS 2 and DS 4). This classic WTO case already referred to in FN15 above is about a regulation by the United States' Environmental Protection Agency under the Clean Air Act of 1990, set up to control toxic and other pollution caused by the combustion of gasoline manufactured in or imported into the United States. The AB reversed the Panel and found that the regulation did fall within the terms of GATT-Article XX(g). It nonetheless concluded that the so-called baseline establishment rules in the US regulation 'fail to meet the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX of the General Agreement, and accordingly are not justified under Article XX of the General Agreement.' (Appellate Body Report US -Gasoline, dated 29 April 1996, p.28 lit.a and c -italics in the original) 35 De Bièvre, Espa and Poletti (2017) have tried to explain the quasi-absence of fossil fuel cases and the "skewed distribution of energy subsidies dispute settlement complaints at the WTO." They correctly noted that, rather than addressing the general harmfulness of all energy subsidies under the ASCM, most of these cases focus on renewable project incentives subject to local content requirements.
The EU Aviation Directive is a case in point where several countries, including China, Malaysia and the USA, argued that this measure violated WTO non-discrimination rules, even though according to the Annex on Air Transport Services such services are explicitly excluded from the scope of the GATS. Accordingly, they threatened with retaliation if the EU should go ahead regardless with its Directive introduced in 2012. The issue -and the fundamental question whether the EU's aviation scheme could be justified (here under Article XIV of the GATS) -was never addressed in a WTO dispute. Subsequently, the EU had to suspend this climate-friendly measure by which all airlines, regardless of their origin, would have had to acquire and 'surrender' to the EU allowances for the CO 2 emissions produced by their aircrafts. Bartels (2012) shows that border carbon adjustments varying with transport distances might not withstand a WTO legal challenge. He also demonstrated that the EU's scheme violated its international civil aviation obligations, after it had failed to obtain an international agreement on an aviation ETS within the framework of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
A carbon scheme that is administratively feasible and WTO-compatible remains to be found.
Meltzer (2012) Notwithstanding the rather dogmatic judiciary, and the ‚splendid isolation' of the multilateral trading system, it should be noted that all WTO provisions can be the object of am endments. Here too, only the General Council can take such a decision, with a majority of at least three fourths of the membership (Art. X of the WTO Agreement). The only precedent is the 'affordable drugs' amendment of the TRIP Agreement. This was the first ever amendment of a WTO rule, without relevance for climate policies.
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The same procedure applies to w aivers in favour of a particular Member or group of Members allowing them not to comply with specific rules and obligations. Waivers are more frequent and somewhat easier to obtain than amendments, but they have time limits, and each extension has to be justified. 41 One specific example at the juncture between Trade 38 To take a perhaps not too remote example, an indirect government preference for domestic competitors threatened by, say, rising sea levels, might perhaps find acceptance in a WTO dispute as a Paris-related measure, even though it could de facto discriminate foreign suppliers and products. The underlying principle is that -just like the Paris Agreement -the WTO's DSB cannot rule on the policies or their objectives, only on a specific measure taken by one of its members. Neither can it prescribe 'good governance' or 'good policies.' Put simply, its only role is to protect its membership against protectionism. Also, the WTO litigation procedure is 'automatic' in the sense that when a complainant considers that its WTO rights are infringed by another member, it can and will obtain the establishment of a dispute settlement panel. Such a panel is then bound to report its findings to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) which in turn will 'automatically' endorse these findings (except by a never-happened consensual rejection). Both parties can appeal these findings. Ultimately the AB is, like the panels, bound to submit to the DSB its findings on the compliance of the revised measures with the WTO obligations of the respondent. A non-compliance ruling adopted by the DSB allows the complainant to eventually demand enforcement through the ‚arbitrator', usually the original Panel, if need be by recourse to the so-called retaliation procedure involving an authorisation to 'withdraw concessions.' At this stage, the arbitrator would determine the maximum retaliation amount; the AB and the DSB cannot review or correct that amount. The complainant is then free to apply punitive tariffs above the MFN level against imports from the respondent.
The only scenario by which this ‚automatic' settlement of disputes might look beyond WTO would be if a panel or the AB, based on the VCLT, find in a specific case that international treaty law supersedes WTO trade law. At any rate, in view of the above-mentioned case law, and the at least initially extremely large leeway afforded by the Paris agreement, climate change mitigation measures are unlikely candidates for a WTO revolution, even under the most activist WTO judges.
What can then be said at this stage except that, at a very general level, WTO Law and practice appear as a self-contained bulwark against discrimination -including discrimination inherent in climate-smart measures with a collateral negative trade impact? On the other side, while the diplomatic presumption of ‚mutual supportiveness' turns out to be a poor guide for NDC formulation, it is equally impossible to conclude that no exception, amendment or waiver can cure the discriminatory implications of footprint differentiations. In our preliminary legal analysis in Section 3 we look at some of the emerging patterns for the implementation of the Paris Agreement in the light of relevant WTO provisions. Again, this is not a legal opinion, but an initial discussion of different instances where climate measures or specific NDC might face WTO challenges under one of the WTO provisions listed in Box 5.
Before looking at the already available NDC, however, it is perhaps useful to briefly look at another difference between the WTO and the Paris Convention, namely the way each of these treaties deals with the development differences between their constituents.
Adressing Development Concerns
Under the Paris Agreement, the Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) is an obligation for all parties when formulating their NDC. The above-quoted wording in Article 2.2 is the result of protracted negotiations about the role and impact of historic and present, and of relative and absolute GHG producers.
As said before, ‚Paris' has no specific obligations on how to take the CBDR principle into account. Not surprisingly, most developing countries pledge to contribute to the goal of not exceeding global warming by more than 2 0 C, but they subject a part of their measures to the availability of funds. On their side, developed countries commit to not only reduce their footprint but -depending on domestic policy considerations and debates -to also finance climate programmes in poor countries in order to limit global warming to 1.5 0 C. Some of them do so by claiming ETS/IET credits; but all of them acknowledge the CBDR principle.
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In the WTO, like for its predecessor the GATT, the development concerns of the membership are reflected in a quite different way. Each and every WTO Agreement acknowledges the development dimension, up to and including the most recent Trade Faciliation Agreement which foresees specific measures supporting developing country efforts to make trade flow more freely (TFA). Beyond the preambular language, the classic precept of reciprocal and multilateral concessions is toned down with numerous preferences from which only developing countries, or only least developing countries (LDC) will benefit. This means in WTO speak that ‚Special and Differentiated Treatment' (SDT) is offered to (self-designated) developing countries and to LDC (i) for their rights in terms of exceptions, flexibilities, and differentiated rules, and (ii) for obligations relative to notification formats and deadlines, transparency, and other procedural and institutional provisions. issues (public stockholdings, or fisheries) the same goes for amendments and waivers (or pledges of non-litigation).
More importantly still, ‚SDT' offers no avenues for measures addressing climate-related concerns of smallholders, women, nomads, or small fishermen as mentioned in the Paris Agreement. Obviously, such measures are difficult to design without the WTO having to look into domestic affairs. Any effort to accommodate such concerns in the WTO would have to avoid opening the door to all kinds of freeways whereby the gains of progressive and mutual trade liberalisation could again be squandered without a corresponding climate-friendly gain for all. Nevertheless, the challenge for any meaningful climate-smart SDT is to design support programmes without negatively impacting on market access rights and interests of third (developing) countries.
Climate Provisions in Regional Agreements
Before closing this general overview of multilateral trade rules a word is indicated on regional trade agreements (also called preferential, or free trade, or economic partnership agreements).
Generally speaking the new generation of RTA, especially ‚North-South' treaties, emphasises the importance of sustainable development also in a trade and investment context; some make a special mention of climate change. However, none appears to have substantive ‚WTO Plus' provisions relevant for climate mitigation measures, none has ever put any limits on domestic agricultural support, and (so far) none of them refers to the still newer Paris Agreement.
This does not mean that Regional Agreements cannot show a way forward for the dichotomy between trade and environment rules and societal concerns. Recent agreements typically contain exhortatory language over and above the hitherto usual preambular texts. 45 Whether a 'TPP11' will address climate change -as the originally signed text did -remains to be seen. Some RTA have extensive dispute settlement procedures possibly involving private operators and sometimes even civil society organisations, and all refer to relevant WTO disciplines. Most importantly for this article, the agreements concluded by the USA and the EU innovate in their procedural and institutional set-up provisions. The Joint Committees e.g. on Environment and Trade offer a pre-litigation avenue for a discussion between the trading partners. These institutional mechanisms can be said to at least match the corresponding WTO fora which often are exclusively staffed by trade diplomats. While actual sanctions are extremely rare, a ‚regional' committee process can and does yield insights into the reasons for a government taking -or omitting -measures with a negative environmental impact. In addition, so-called cases of carbon leakage (‚eco-dumping' and, similarly, ‚socio-dumping') can eventually lead to a withdrawal of concessions not unlike under the WTO litigation procedures. The key to such sanctions is not the environmental degradation or a violation of basic workers' rights, but the trade distortion caused, for instance, by illegal logging or child labour.
Another reason underlining the importance of regional trade agreements is their more constraining review and deliberation process. In the light of these elements, and given the remoteness of a climate-smart WTO, regionalism might appear, for the time being, as a slightly better, if still indirect, avenue to climate disciplines enforcement. Unilateral measures may fall foul of WTO doctrine protecting against discrimination, and insisting on internationally agreed standards. But a ‚North-South' RTA might help enforcement of commitments under international environmental treaties, or ILO Conventions -thanks to the frequent power imbalance between parties.
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In the WTO, even a serious discussion on environmental issues or workers' rights has so far been prevented by its membership. When will the trading community be ready to discuss climate measures?
A Preliminary Legal Analysis
As already indicated, none of the presently available INDC and NDC provide sufficient details on the ways and means to implement the Paris Agreement. Perhaps tellingly, the NDC of developed countries are even less specific in this regard, whereas many developing countries have outlined their plans with more specificity. Particularly noteworthy in this respect is China's INDC which describes a number of potentially climate-smart agricultural modernisation programmes. In poorer countries the declared intentions to comply with their Paris commitments are partly subject to the availability of sufficient funds -a right which might be compromised by the withdrawal of the US signature. Countries like India also insist that climate change mitigation cannot come at the expense of their development.
Given the present lack of precision and enactment of concrete implementation measures with a potential trade impact, only a preliminary legal analysis under a WTO perspective will be possible here. Based on recent literature describing climate-related border measures and subsidies, our considerations in this section will look at a number of measures envisaged in the various NDC (Benda and Zimmermann/FAO 2018) . We particularly look at five types of programmes, likely to have repercussions on trade and services and investment, namely climate-related agricultural border measures (1); taxes (2); subsidies (3); climate tools intended to shape producer and consumer behaviour with other means, such as Non-Tariff Measures (NTM) by way of consumer information labels (4); and some risk management and risk insurance instruments (5).
Border Measures
The Paris Agreement, without saying so, implies counteracting 'like' products and services with a higher footprint. Even the choice of energy producing such goods may be 'discriminated' where countries move out of coal, if they then expect imports to have been produced in a comparable climate-friendly way. This of course can take place in a number of different ways, and not necessarily through discrimination of only foreign goods (MFN/NT).
To be clear, Paris does not prescribe border adjustment measures (BAM). The specific situation in each country and region, and the rapid technology development in this field, prevent a general assumption on the necessity of BAM. For instance, whether a carbon tax yields a better result, for global food security, than carbon sequestration, depends on many different factors. 50 Hence, the WTO would be ill-advised not to examine the possibility for a legal pathway including BAM.
Political expediency in many countries will often demand compensation for climate adaptation efforts, and restrictions at the border corresponding to those at home. Without a clarification in respect of BAM, the climate-smart policy measures outlined in Box 1 might well have to forego both restrictions and prohibitions at home and at the border. The tool box would then be limited to 'carrots' such as R&D, technology transfer, ODA, and other clearly Green Box support. Whether countries can then meet their Paris commitments with carrots alone is an open question. Politically speaking, the sensitivity of agriculture makes self-discrimination extremely difficult, consisting in giving away ‚carrots' abroad without BAM.
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Such a ‚circle of action paralysis' could also apply to 'sticks' at home involving production prohibitions, or the internalisation of carbon emissions costs e.g. through taxation.
Perhaps tellingly, the FAO survey of INDC and NDC has shown no concrete examples of governments explicitly proposing to implement climate-related agricultural BAM in order to ensure equal treatment of imports and national production mitigation policies (Benda and Zimmermann/FAO 2018) . Some intervention proposals are sufficiently broad and general to potentially include BAM. But even New Zealand -the only country known to have envisaged such a measure because of the high absolute GHG production of its agricultural industry -is now no longer officially contemplating such measures. The main reason for this ‚general inaction' may lie in the fact that so far only mitigation and adaptation subsidies are being proposed or introduced. This being, many NDC indicate a commitment to develop some sort of policy framework and institutional developments geared towards the mitigation of GHG emissions. China, for example, includes commitments to strengthen laws and regulations on climate change, and to implement their National Program on Climate Change and provincial climate programs. These are commitments that could include everything or nothing, but it is easy to see that a BAM could be part of broader efforts to shape the legal and regulatory sphere necessary to agree on an ambitious climate mitigation package.
Very few more NDC specifics are available. One outstanding example is South Africa stating that policy instruments under development include regulatory standards and controls for specifically identified GHG pollutants and emitters. Given South Africa's particularly strong exposure to climate change, this could be read as part of an ambitious mitigation programme requiring sacrifices at home, but also as a pointer towards BAM possibly conflicting with WTO rules.
Actual border measures differing for identical imports save for a different footprint, or applying to goods with a higher footprint than that of 'like' domestic products have not yet been notified to the WTO. Here, the legal limits are clear: not only are tariffs in excess of the scheduled MFN rates prohibited. Several DSB rulings banned a number of measures such as variable import levies or discretionary licensing (which under Article 4.2 were to be 'tariffied' i.e. transformed into tariffs) -even when they did not breach the MFN level.
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It should also be remembered that scheduled (i.e. bound) tariffs can be raised again, but only with adequate compensation offered to so-called 'principal' and 'substantial suppliers' of the goods involved (Art.XXVIII GATT). Other procedures apply to a modification of services commitments (Art.XXI GATS). Whether tariff increases (without differentiation) are conducive to better climate adaptation is another question.
51 Chile -Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural Products (DS 207) However, the most important impediment for BAM by way of tariffs or taxes differentiating according to footprints, or air transport distances, are the already mentioned national treatment provisions in Articles III:2 (prohibiting unjustified tariff differences) and III:4 GATT (allowing only legitimate regulatory distinctions).
Solutions are definitely difficult to come by. Policymakers and operators willing to reduce GHG emissions at home are unlikely to accept what in their view amounts to 'eco-dumped' competing products. On the other hand, if a domestic subsidy were to not only reduce carbon footprint but, in addition, lower production costs and increase exports, a close look at how such climate measures are formulated and implemented would be necessary. A 'more than climate-necessary' subsidy element would have to be excluded from, say, a WTO rules amendment for purposes of Paris implementation of the type discussed in Section 3.3 above. Perhaps the same necessity requirement would have to be built into an economic assessment of antidumping measures or countervailing duties, and for the below discussed subsidies and other incentives (Section 4.3). Again, internationally agreed standards would provide an extremely useful threshold here.
At this point, and in agreement with much of the recent literature, we have to conclude that BAM look like rather difficult propositions in the absence of agreed and mandatory international standards (Kang 2010 , Holzer 2014 ).
Tax My Footprint?
Taxes on activities which are considered socially undesirable are sometimes called 'sin taxes'. Their intended effect is preventive (as opposed to taxes or fines for damages to society). Classic examples along the food chain are sumptuary taxes to mitigate the use of alcohol or tobacco. A fully successful soda tax on sugar-sweetened beverages was launched in Berkeley/California. Francis, Marron and Rueben (2016) describe the initial resistance to this scheme, its results compared with other Californian municipalities, and the very rapid spread of soda taxes worldwide. Political acceptance even in ‚tax-resilient' legislatives turns out to be higher where tax revenues are reinvested in school-feeding and other public health programmes. This might also be the case for climate change mitigation for the transport sector, starting for instance with a tax on vehicles emitting excessive pollutants. On the other hand, public health policies so far unsuccessfully experimented with fat taxes (Denmark, United Kingdom). Cash-strapped Portugal envisages a salt tax for mid-2018.
Here again, not a lot emerges explicitly from the NDC so far available. Taxation for climate change mitigation could be included under any broad commitment to reduce emissions or in the promotion of green technologies, which are abundant in the NDC analysed by FAO. But it is too early to see clearer indications on how governments intend to pursue such goals.
Canada, for example, commits to taking strong action in the pursuit of a low-carbon economy, green infrastructure and clean technology. India sets the promotion of clean biomass energy as a goal. Fossil fuel subsidies in oil-producing countries are still as abundant as they are criticised by economists. Unsurprisingly, but only vaguely, Nigeria talks about reforming its petrol/diesel subsidies. While there are several ways through which these could be pursued, taxation of inputs and production practices with heavy footprints could undoubtedly be one of them. Interestingly, Armenia proposes to create a climate change civil fund to be replenished by receipts stemming from environment fees including carbon taxing.
Climate change mitigation-related taxes can have international repercussions. As shown above for the EU's aviation ETS, this can easily raise opposition by affected countries, mainly because excise taxes applied based on the distance travelled by 'like' products could fall foul of Article III GATT. As for actual WTO case law, the rulings in US -Foreign Sales Corporation (DS 108) as well as for subsidies on large civil aircraft (DS 316, 317, 347 and 353) confirmed that both direct and indirect taxes remain subject to multilateral trade rules in respect of subsidies, taxes, and BAM (Daly 2005) .
Subsidies
In a ‚stick and carrot' view of regulatory action, subsidies are often an effective if not necessarily efficient climate action tool. Interestingly, not only developed countries use taxpayer contributions for various societal objectives and for farm income support purposes, some of which with a food security or even a climate mitigation component. Nowadays, many developing countries increasingly find the necessary resources for such purposes. As a result, especially so-called Amber Box support measures contribute to farm security in a way which other countries choose not to go, and which poor countries find impossible to compete with on world markets, and even at home. Coming to their defence, perhaps, are limitations established by case law referred above and below for tax breaks 52 and for export competition instruments such as agricultural export credits. 53 Similarly, export state trading practices of such as export and import restrictions made effective through state-trading operations of Marketing Boards must be guided by 'commercial considerations' (GATT-Article XVII).
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The post-Paris NDC are a very first implementation step. Action proposals and commitments are still very vague and general in scope. However, except in the NDC of developed countries which offer little beyond an emission reduction target, subsidies appear to be among the policy instruments more likely to be used throughout the sample of NDC taken into consideration. In fact, commitments to promote or mainstream some sort of sustainable practice or technology, formulated in a variety of ways and which would easily allow for subsidies of some type, are present in most NDC.
Canada, for instance, proposes to invest significantly in a low-carbon economy, green infrastructure and clean technology. China intends to make efforts to achieve zero growth of fertiliser and pesticide utilisation. Mexico wants to strengthen the diversification of sustainable agriculture. Vietnam has included the development of sustainable agriculture as a means for emission reduction.
Under a climate perspective the subsidy issue looks different from the WTO approach of nondiscrimination and trade distortion avoidance. A more thorough examination of the Climate 52 US -Upland Cotton (DS 267) 53 US -Foreign Sales Corporation (DS 108) 54 The Decision on Export Competition taken at the Tenth Ministerial Conference in Nairobi to abolish export subsidies for farm exports may also be relevant for other export competition instruments (cf. WT/MIN(15)/45 dated 21 December 2015). It is too early, however, to gauge whether climate measures will directly or indirectly benefit, or on the contrary be impeded, by this new discipline.
Agricultural Trade Rules and Climate Change Commitments
Change Tool Box for Agriculture (Box 1) definitely merits consideration if trade competition with subsidies alleging climate mitigation or adaptation is to be contained. The Paris peer review process might shed some light on some of these measures. Other international organisations like the FAO, UNCTAD, or the OECD, could also contribute with their means to the identification of climate-smart policies, standards -and subsidies.
The key for an economic impact assessment of agricultural subsidies in a climate perspective would probably be the contribution of a ‚differentiating' subsidy under the Paris Agreement.
Here again, not everybody is equal. Some temperate climate countries may actually benefit from global warming, with little or no justification for a subsidy. Closer to the Equator, adaptation subsidies and ODA might find economic justification especially for farmers without meaningful support from their governments.
Consumer Information
WTO rules are to act as guardians against altering competitive conditions not only for regulating imports. WTO rules also impact on some of the simplest awareness-raising tools such as marketing and consumer information regulations. At least part of a country's citizenship is likely to be open to what economists like to call 'nudging'. Hence, the implementation of the Paris Agreement may well motivate governments to prescribe certain types of labels, for instance by indicating the footprint of a particular product. Consumers can then take their purchase decisions and yet remain free to buy their preferred product.
While nobody in the WTO questions consumer information as an objective, heated debates take place for specific labelling schemes, particularly in the TBT Committee.
So far, no ‚climate label' as a tool for an agricultural policy objective has come to the forefront in these debates. Of course, nudging works differently for climate concerns than for, say, smoking, animal health, child labour, or obesity prevention. But a plethora of recent labelling schemes introduced for public health purposes are perhaps an indication of how such issues might be treated under WTO rules and procedures. Boza and Espinoza (2016) describe the 'specific trade concerns' expressed by a number of country delegates in respect of a health-related label scheme notified by the Chilean government (see Window 2 below). The compulsory marking by way of ‚rotulos' for prepackaged food with high contents of calories, sodium, saturated fats and sugar was seen by other trade diplomats as ‚health warnings' representing technical trade barriers hardly compatible with the TBT Agreement.
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55 The TBT Agreement tries to ensure that standards are genuinely useful, and not arbitrary or protectionist (Art. 2.1, 2.2 and 2.4). These measures might be governmental regulations but also private norms adopted by national and international standard-setting bodies. The Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards (TBT Annex 3) is a set of procedural rules which these bodies are encouraged to follow when they elaborate their standards. However, unlike the SPS Agreement, the TBT Agreement does not refer to any specific international organisations or standards as guidance. Nonetheless, several TBT dispute settlement cases referred to such standards as an indication of a consensus on how to implement the underlying policy objective without erecting trade barriers. In this sense the TBT Agreement can be read as a useful guideline for national measures addressing the policy objective in a transparent and comprehensive way (Source, for this and for the debates on the Chilean 'rotulos': TBT Information Management System, available at http://tbtims.wto.org/)
The concerns expressed did not question the scientific justification of the levels triggering the labelling obligation, following recommendations by the WHO for the control and prevention of obesity. Rather, the proposed regulation was seen as modifying conditions of competition in favour of domestic producers and to the disadvantage of global brand operators. For instance, Australia noted that the application of a mandatory health message referring to levels of specific critical nutrients was not consistent with the principle of the Codex Alimentarius Guidelines on Nutrition Labelling that 'the information should not lead consumers to believe that there is exact quantitative knowledge of what individuals should eat in order to maintain health, but rather to convey an understanding of the quantity of nutrients contained in the product.'
Window 2: Chile's Consumer Information Health Labels
Source: Boza and Espinoza (2016) Notwithstanding widespread criticism, at home and in the WTO, Chile adopted the measure in 2016, after numerous TBT Committee Sessions in 2013, 2014 and 2015. So far, no formal complaint has been lodged in this case. Other countries, for instance Peru, are very likely to follow this type of health policy tool. Nonetheless, this example shows that measures with international implications and markets segmentation are not an easy road. Even a somewhat ‚softer' nudging tool like the ‚traffic-light labels' indicating different energy efficiency of household appliances in Europe, took considerable time to gain acceptance, mainly because of non-transparent efficiency criteria. A UK Government project to introduce similar traffic lights, indicating health properties of breakfast cereals in 2018 met with considerable opposition by the European Dairy Association. And when Italy obliged food labels to indicate the name of the production factory, EU industry representatives protested.
Explicit calls for increased consumer information and awareness appear sparsely in the publicly available NDC. A good example, again without providing too much detail, is Nigeria's commitment to significantly increase public awareness and involve private sector participation.
Without opining on the general WTO-compatibility of mandatory consumer information it seems obvious that labels providing consumers with, say, footprint information might face criticism in the WTO. As shown in Box 3, of the only two labelling cases ever brought to the DSB, both claiming to be trade-neutral consumer information labels, the first one was still pending at the time of writing this article. The second case ended with the respondent withdrawing the incriminated regulation in order to avoid retaliation. It is often stipulated that global warming and climate change bring about more, and more devastating, natural disasters. Hurricanes, typhoons and blizzards may occur with a higher intensity, more monsoon irregularities, rising sea levels due to melting glaciers and permafrost reduction. While a clear correlation is in many cases yet to be established, the main insurance and reinsurance companies are fully aware of this danger. Some have already reduced their risk exposure or increased their insurance premiums. Obviously, the not unlikely scenario of more rains falling at the wrong time and in the wrong places would impact especially on agriculture.
This is not necessarily a problem for global food security, as long as climate change beneficiary farmers can compensate the production fall-outs. Demand-side measures to reduce demand especially in developed countries for ruminant livestock products remain a major challenge though, because some producers will inevitably go out of business but hopefully find remunerative alternatives. Hence, the food security issue to be addressed both under the Paris and the WTO Agreements is how mitigation can take place at local and national levels without driving producers out of business, and prices out of an affordable range.
Responsible governments, at any rate, are re-examining their options. A variety of risk m anagem ent instruments have been in use since many years, with public support especially for specific risks and risk management instruments. The classic example on the weather front is hail, frost and flood insurance allowing farmers to buy coverage for production losses beyond their control (Munroe 2017) . Some (mainly developed) countries where prices are not fixed by the state offer insurance for many other risks as well, including disaster risks, domestic and export market price variations, drought, and bio-security. Presently, the main users appear to be the United States, China, Canada, Japan and Spain. Australia, New Zealand and The Netherlands are relatively small users, but they presently try to innovate for climate-related risks. The OECD describes some of these programmes under covering long term effects of climate change might well be in the offing -at what and whose cost is another question. Perhaps surprisingly, no INDC/NDC appears to report the various weather insurance schemes in place or envisaged in both developed and developing countries. One reference is China's intention to ‚improve the green credit mechanisms, to encourage and guide financial institutions to operate energy-efficiency crediting business and to issue asset securitized products for green credit assets' -without specifications on how this will be implemented.
In view of the additional and different risks climate change entails, some such instruments might well offer considerable advantages both for facilitating adaptation and for bridging repeated harvest losses. At the sometime, the economic rationale for such schemes should be studied carefully, also taking into account that poorer countries may not be able to compete here. But the question under a trade rules perspective is whether adaptation programmes, premium subsidies, or other forms of governmental help can be considered to distort trade. This is, not least, a question of the duration of the risk, and of the government support. A permanent support scheme would more likely fall into the Amber Box than punctual and time-limited production retirement and disaster relief programmes reducing the marketable production volumes. Such programmes may find coverage under the Green Box (and thus be available without a quantitative limit) provided the relevant conditions are met. For instance, three are numerous conditions for production loss insurance and income safety net programmes. 57 Similar Green Box conditions apply to compensation for production losses of at least 30% due to large disasters. Finally, it should be noted that in order to qualify as a Green Box measure (not subject to limitations or reductions) all these programmes are subject to additional conditions. In particular, they are required to be 'no or at most minimally' trade distorting.
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Accordingly, since 2012 the perhaps largest such program, the US Crop Insurance Support Program, has been notified to the WTO as (trade-distorting) 'product-specific support.' In combination with other large farm subsidies, such risk hedging schemes may exert 'serious prejudice' to foreign producers without insurance programmes. On the other hand, in the cotton case the Panel found that crop insurance alone did not contribute to serious prejudice, since losses were based on production rather than price various US farm support programmes. This ruling was not appealed, perhaps because those other programmes were found to encourage production and exports, with the result of driving down world market prices to the disadvantage of Brazil's and other cotton producers.
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Besides, the US Crop Insurance Support Program is related to world market price changes, not (directly) to weather risks. Joseph Glauber (2015) posits that risk management support is likely to fall into the category of trade-distorting instruments -the so-called 'Amber Box.' This does not mean they are prohibited; but the total public expenditures under all such programmes, or for a specific commodity, are limited -for all WTO Members.
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Finally, looking at climate change adaptation measures, the NDC analysis of the FAO shows an interesting result (Benda and Zimmermann/FAO 2018) . Presently, there is hardly any mention of adaptation measures in developed country NDC, as opposed to those of developing countries where they figure extensively. This might be due to the fact that developed countries benefit broadly speaking more often of a temperate climate, while many developing countries are more likely to suffer from extreme consequences of climate change. As a consequence, within many of the analysed developing country NDC, there is scope for potential risk management measures by way of adaptation programmes.
The green credit mechanisms in China, and Armenia's proposal for a climate change civil fund with an appropriate legislative institutional framework for adequate financial assistance, have been mentioned above. In a broader manner, Egypt for instance commits to building an effective institutional system to manage climate change associated crises and disaster.
The increasing recourse to insurance, with public support, is likely to continue, including in the name of climate change. Like for subsidies, economists might also point out that disaster insurance as an adaptation tool would not be eo ipso climate smart if it creates incentives for farmers to stay producing in zones where production becomes less feasible, in the long term, due to climate change.
Conclusions: Act Carefully but Rapidly
This article tried to show which trade rules might matter for what kind of climate measures.
The main criteria for a legal assessment under the multilateral trade framework of the WTO remain the positive or negative discriminatory elements of a measure, inasmuch as they modify the conditions of competition. This means that for instance, climate impact considerations would matter only for the assessment of a legal defence e.g. under GATTArticle XX. However, recent case law appears to leave more room for a holistic approach. For instance, the efficiency and effectiveness of technical regulations, e.g. in terms of carbon footprint reductions, can now taken into consideration in order to validate an exception to a rules violation. To take the example of a technical regulation, a 'legitimate regulatory distinction' is now a sufficient condition to justify e.g. a rules violation under the basic conditions of TBT-Art. 2.2. 60 As for an impact assessment of a consumer information label, both cases described in Box 3 innovated. In US -COOL the Panel found that additional costs due to the measure did not have to fall equally on foreign and domestic products. has been argued that no WTO ruling has ever contributed to a violation of human rights violations, and that 'pragmatic solutions' were found for access to medicines and blood diamonds (Petersmann 2009:76) . Gabrielle Marceau (2006) consistently emphasises that a good faith interpretation of WTO rules will in many cases allow for a 'coherent reading' with human rights.
Absent a valid exception (i.e. an interpretation by the General Council, an amendment, or a time-limited waiver), many measures claiming to implement the Paris commitments may appear problematic under the present trade rules. Any country feeling discriminated against can instigate dispute settlement procedures. And if a rules violation is established, the adjudicator (Panel or AB) has to issue a ruling which will be endorsed by the DSB, calling upon the respondent to comply. In the (rare) cases of non-compliance, the complainant has the right to 'retaliate' by withdrawing a concession of substantially equal value to its trade losses.
Other climate-related issues such as the renewable energy disputes listed in Box 2 show an emerging case law applying the trade rules in 'splendid isolation' -mostly without admitting WTO exceptions as a valid defence. Despite having the duty, recognised by the AB, to examine violation claims, and defences, other than under WTO Law, no adjudicator has ever found peremptory public international law (ius cogens) to overrule WTO Law. The lack of specific and clearly climate-related obligations, or mandatory international standards in multilateral environmental agreements, including the Paris Agreement, makes the case of a respondent invoking such provisions very difficult.
For agriculture, specific climate-related measures are yet to be notified to the WTO. There is no directly relevant case law. Moreover, climate-smart agricultural standards and practices are still to be developed at the international level. The available INDC and NDC provide little more than a number of possible avenues where developing and developed countries declare their intention to reduce GHG production along the food value chain. The Paris process should thus be seen both as a challenge and an opportunity for policy-makers, as well as for national and international standard development, and for shaping producer and consumer behaviour. This development dimension appears as another blind spot under the multilateral trade rules. Rich countries and those with small farming sectors obviously are in a different position in their choice than poor countries, especially those with a high relative footprint in terms of output units, as is often the case for small and subsistence farmers, nomads, and fishermen. Put simply, a draft animal produces more methane than a tractor. The same goes for a suckling cow compared with a hyper-performing animal, in terms of meat and milk output per unit of methane (CH 4 ). Unfortunately, while the Paris Agreement obliges all countries to take the development dimension into account when formulating their NDC, it does not indicate which policy tools are really climate-smart or development-friendly, or both.
This leaves the trade community with a task it has not yet started to seriously examine, let alone negotiate. True, there are a number of exceptions to all general and specific trade rules. They are regularly used in litigation, including GATT-Article XX for environment and natural resource protection, health, and public morals, Article XXI for national security, and Article XVIII for infant industry protection. The official description of all SDT provisions reflecting WTO development concerns and flexibilities took 130 pages back in 2001. However, this article posits that, generally speaking, these provisions and defences may be good for preventing trade distortions, or improving developing country market access, or alleviate structural adjustment pains -but they do not allow for permanently ‚differentiated' climate change mitigation and adaptation.
What can be done? For instance, should a 'Paris waiver' be added to the list of measures in GATT-Article XX? And, provided such a mile change is feasible, would the very restrictive 'chapeau' of that article leave sufficient policy space for at least those measures which are devoid of major trade distortions? Are the SDT provisions in the relevant WTO agreements sufficient to give poor developing countries, and their large emitters, adequate farm support tools, and effective market access for their climate-smart export products?
This article can only show the potential problems of some of the envisaged measures. At this stage of NDC development, trade problems are theoretically possible for three main types of measures:
1 Support for only national producers embracing GHG reducing production when such subsidies not only compensate for the disadvantage vis-à-vis other national producers but also enhancing export competition or import displacement. 2 Border measures for only climate-'unfriendly' products and production methods, whether or not they increase WTO-agreed tariff maxima. 3 Consumer information schemes like government-regulated labels indicating product footprint.
So far, the WTO comitology has failed to address such problems in any detail. Besides, some of these problems would also appear to call for a similar reflection in respect of international investment treaties, regional trade agreements, and sectorial agreements on energy, aviation, water management, shipping, fishing and migration. In addition, in order to fulfil the Paris-enshrined Development Dimension, various types of preferential treatment for climate-friendly products and processing methods from developing countries would also have to be re-evaluated.
Pending a serious exercise of reflection by the trading community, in association with the national and international climate change stakeholders, it is difficult to propose solutions in concrete terms. Nevertheless, it is hoped that this article may contribute to ending the affirmation by politicians and diplomats, up and including at the COP21 meeting in Paris, that environment and trade policies are eo ipso 'mutually supportive'. The both ambitious and urgent reflection (and possibly negotiation) proposed here would allow to identify policy areas and measures 1 where quick solutions for possible conflicts might be available 2 where a review of trade rules (or waivers thereof) and available international standards might be necessary 3 with some early indications of how this could be done: inter-institutional cooperation and procedures, academic support, and interagency government delegations' involvement at the international level.
This article concludes with a tentative list of WTO rules where minimally trade-impacting adjustments might be considered (i) applying to all countries or (ii) exclusively to poor developing countries (Box 5). This list is not a carte blanche for climate action by any means. For instance, a carbon tax might be less climate-smart, yet more trade-restrictive, than a subsidised sequestration programme. Similarly, the present boom in risk insurance schemes with government support may have adverse effects on judicious risk taking by operators, without additional benefits for more climate mitigation or food security. Nonetheless, WTO would be ill-placed to refuse a debate on the climate tool list, and on the suggested rules review, just for its own dogmatic reasons. The last three Ministerial Conferences almost failed because the food stockpile issue was not dealt with seriously and with an understanding of the different interests at stake (Galtier 2017) . 62 Now is perhaps the time for a new effort to look beyond trade and economic but non-sustainable growth.
As for the development dimension, extreme care is warranted in addressing this issue, knowing that all GHG emissions have global, not merely national, effects. For instance, it can be argued that to exclude middle-income and large developing countries may be justifiable on the basis of the need to contain the potential proliferation of trade distortions due to climate polices (in addition to any other considerations, e.g., equity). On the other hand, inaction by large GHG emitters (at any level of development) can have a very serious impact on global warming. These considerations would seem to indicate a need for extreme caution, and possibly an ad hoc approach with different thresholds, for each climate-motivated exception to the trade rules. This is not a work programme. But considering that up to nineteen agreements and other texts might be concerned by the 'Climate vs WTO Challenge', and that the Paris/NDC process requires a rapid development of mitigation and adaptation measures, it seems obvious that work in the WTO constituency and beyond should start as soon as possible. However, some key issues identified in this article also require progress in the climate fora (COP) and on the development side (SDG). Intergovernmental work, in parallel and on all fronts, could lead to a trade-and development-friendly framework for the elaboration of climate-smart policies under the Paris Agreement. On 14 November 2017 the COP23 decided to 'address issues related to agriculture, [...] taking into consideration the vulnerabilities of agriculture to climate change and approaches to addressing food security.' (UNFCCC/IPCC 2017) This (draft) decision would seem to indicate an acknowledgement that turning a blind eye to this sector which is key for food security and for development, is no longer possible. If countries are to move forward with the implementation of policies that are both effective in achieving climate change mitigation and adaptation, while at the same time meeting other international objectives (i.e. a level-playing field for trade, and SDG fulfilment) this will need to be addressed without further ado.
Climate change is likely to affect agricultural production, as we today know it, even more than other sectors. And small producers in poor developing countries -in fact, the majority of the world's farmers -may well be among those facing the biggest problems in the absence of efficient, effective, and climate-and trade-friendly solutions. Adjustments to be considered "without more than a minimal trade impact"
 for all WTO Members  only for poor developing countries and measures 62 Franck Galtier analyses what he calls the ‚biases in current WTO rules for estimating the support provided to farmers through public stockholding programmes' and proposes to correct these biases by the ‚right metrics on the support provided to farmers through public stockholding programmes', both under the AoA and the SCM.
Agricultural Trade Rules and Climate Change Commitments
AoA
Annex 2 ('Green Box'): to add a paragraph 14 allowing for efficient and effective climate mitigation support measures based on internationally recognised standards (e.g. best agricultural practices), at levels with no more than a minimal impact on trade and production.
Art. 6.2 (Developing Country Green Box) to be generally and permanently available for clearly climate-friendly investments and risk management, such as for drought management, flood control, and soil management, including certain credit schemes and subsidies e.g. for irrigation construction, and certain agricultural input subsidies for lowincome or resource-poor producers.
ADP
Anti-dumping disallowed for internationally recognised climate-smart action as long as a subsidy or other incentives to a given product from a particular exporting country do not overcompensate the additional production costs due to the climate-smart action at issue. Anti-dumping is also disallowed where the importing country applies an equivalent climate-smart measure. (Art. 3.5 for causation analysis)
DSU
Adjudicators to consider context and customary international law (as per Art. 31 VCLT) and not to rule out Paris Agreement implementation measures where the underlying climate change mitigation objective cannot be attained otherwise than with a minimal trade distortion.
GATT
1. No WTO rules shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement of measures necessary for implementing the Paris Agreement (e.g. for the internalisation of GHG reduction costs). WTO Members shall benefit from a new provision in GATTArticle XX (lit. k), mutatis mutandis subject to the provisions in the chapeau of Article XX, and taking into consideration the above-suggested DSU modification (establishing 'necessity'). The main rules for which such an exception might be needed are found in Articles I, III:2 and III:4 of the GATT 1994; GATT-Article XXIII (‚non-violation') might also need to be reviewed.
63
2. GHG emission pricing schemes and 'other duties or charges' levied on Reintroduce clearly defined infant industry protection for climate-friendly start-ups in poor developing countries (Art. XVIII GATT).
